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MICHAEL K. BLACK, #5038
Attorney for Respondent
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801) 225-1632
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JODY ROTHE,
Category: 14b
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
DALE KURT ROTHE,

Case No. 880018-CA

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION
The Court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2a-3(2)(g).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order on the Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce entered into the records of the Court on
the 17th day of December, 1987.

The only issue raised by this

appeal

by

is

the

determination

the

Domestic

Relations

Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani, and the subsequent Order of the
Honorable

George

E. Ballif

as

it

relates

to

any

mortgage

obligations on the home received by the Plaintiff.

The Defendant

Dale Rothe did not contest the divorce based upon the Stipulation
of the parties.
In August of 1986, Defendant Dale Rothe filed a Petition for
modification of the Divorce Decree.

In pertinent

part, the

Defendant sought an Order of the Court requiring the Plaintiff,
Jody Rothe, to bear the obligation of a note which Defendant
entered into with his parents for a loan.
from

the

loan was used

to purchase

The money received

a home which

Defendant

purchased before the parties' marriage.
At the time the house was acquired, the Defendant assumed an
existing VA mortgage already on the home and paid the balance
with the money received from his parents.

Pursuant to the terms

of the Decree of Divorce, "the Plaintiff is to assume and be
responsible for the mortgage due and owing on the home of the
parties."

(R. 16)

The matter was first heard before the Domestic Relations
Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani, who determined that Defendant,
Dale Rothe, did not have standing to assert any rights that his
parents might otherwise have to the property.

An objection was

made by the Defendant to the Recommendation.

Consequently, the

matter was then heard before the Honorable George E. Ballif of
the

Fourth

Judicial

District

Court who
2

determined

that the

agreement between Defendant Dale Rothe and his parents did not
constitute

a mortgage

on the home

and

that based

upon the

evidence and documents, Plaintiff Jody Rothe was not obligated to
assume the debt between Dale Rothe and his parents •
the holding

of

Judge

Ballif

which Defendant

It is from

Dale Rothe now

appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Does Defendant, Dale Rothe, have standing to seek the

Court's Order requiring

the Plaintiff

to pay

a debt to his

parents arising out of a loan to the Defendant, Dale Rothe, from
his parents which was used to pay

for a home prior to the

parties' marriage when Defendant has quit claimed any and all
interest

in

the

subject

property

to

the

Plaintiff

and

Defendant's parents have not asserted any claim for repayment
against Defendant Dale Rothe?
II.

Did

the

trial

court

properly

determine

that

the

agreement between Defendant and his parents failed to constitute
a mortgage and, therefore, Plaintiff is not responsible for the
debt?
III.

Did

the

trial

court

properly

determine

that the

withholding of the $150.00 payment by the Defendant, Dale Rothe,
from the support payments which was subsequently paid to his
parents

did

not

rise

to

the
3

level

of

partial

performance

sufficient to establish an equitable mortgage?
IV,

Is it proper for the Court to allow parol evidence as

to the intent and understanding of the parties in light of the
clear and unambiguous language of the Decree of Divorce?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-1-14:
(here insert name), mortgagor, of
(insert place of residence), hereby
mortgages to
(insert name), mortgagee, of
(insert place of residence), for the
sum of $
the following described tract
of land in
county, Utah, to-wit:
(here describe the premises).
This mortgage is given to secure the following
indebtedness.
(Here state amount and form of
indebtedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to
whom payable and where).
The mortgager agrees to pay all taxes and assessments
on said premises, in the sum of $
attorney's fees in the case of foreclosure.
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this
day of
, 19 . Such mortgage as executed by law
shall have the effect of a conveyance of the land
therein described, together with all of the rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to
the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal
representatives as security for the payment of
indebtedness thereon set forth, with covenants from
the mortgagor of general warranty of title, and that
all taxes and assessments levied and assessed upon the
land described, during the continuance of the
mortgage, will be paid previous to the date appointed
for the sale of such lands for taxes; and maybe
foreclosure as provided by law upon any default being
made in any of the conditions thereof as to the
4

payment of either
assessments.

principal,

interest,

taxes or

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an appeal from the Recommendation of the Domestic
Relations Commissioner and the subsequent Order of the Fourth
Judicial

District

Court

in which

the Domestic

Relations

Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani, and the Honorable George E.
Ballif

have

denied

Defendant

Modification

seeking

an Order

Rothe f s

Petition for

of the Court

requiring the

Dale

Plaintiff to assume the obligation of an agreement entered into
between Defendant and Defendant's parents prior to the marriage
of the parties in which Defendant's parents

loaned money to

Defendant for the purchase of the subject home.
Although other issues were addressed and resolved by the
Court pursuant to Defendant's Petition for Modification as well
as Plaintiff's Counter-petition, the only issue relevant to this
appeal is that portion of the Petition which relates to any
mortgage payments on the parties' home and whether the agreement
between Defendant and Defendant's parents constitutes a mortgage
for which Plaintiff should be required to assume.
B.
The

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
original

Complaint

for divorce
5

was filed

by the

Plaintiff, Jody Rothe, on July 17, 1980.

(R. 1)

The Complaint

was accompanied by an Appearance, Consent and Waiver signed by
the Defendant, Dale Rothe, in which Defendant acknowledged that
he understood the Complaint and that he agreed to the contents
thereof.

(R. 5)

On October 24, 1980, the Court entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce.

(R. 11-17)

The

Decree of Divorce provided in pertinent part:
The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible for the
mortgage due and owing upon the home of the parties. .
. (R. 16)
At the time the house was purchased some 9 or 10 months
before the parties' marriage, the Defendant assumed an existing
VA mortgage and borrowed the balance from his parents. (R. 224)
The Defendant, Dale Rothe, filed a Petition to modify the
Decree of Divorce on or about August 21, 1986, alleging that the
agreement he entered into between himself and his parents prior
to the marriage was a debt for which Plaintiff was responsible.
The issue was first presented

to the Domestic

Relations

Commissioner, Howard H. Maetani, by way of proffer and proposed
Findings of Fact who subsequently entered his Recommendation on
the 15th day of June, 1987, (R. 157) refusing to order Plaintiff
to pay any monies to Defendant's parents and further ruled that
Defendant's parents had the obligation of enforcing any rights

6

against

a person who

a Court of competent

determine to be responsible.
On

June

jurisdiction may

(R. 107).

24, 1987, Defendant

filed

an Objection

to the

Recommendation entered by the Domestic Relations Commissioner,
Howard H. Maetani.

(R. 159)

A hearing was held in the Fourth Judicial District Court for
Utah County, State of Utah, before the Honorable George E. Ballif
on

the

16th

presented

day

evidence

Recommendation.
C.

of

December,
on

1987, in which

Defendant's

the

Objection

parties
to

the

(R. 209)

DISPOSITION OF COURT BELOW.

Pursuant to the order of the court

(R. 95) the parties

submitted their proposed Proffers and Findings of Fact to the
Court

arguing

their

respective

positions.

(R.

97-155)

Subsequently, on the 15th day of June, 1987, Howard H. Maetani,
Domestic Relations Commissioner, entered his Recommendation in
which he stated:
The Court makes no order as it relates to the monies
owing to Defendants parents.
If any monies are in
fact due and owing, the Defendant's parents have the
obligation of enforcing any such right againsj persons
who a court of competent jurisdiction may determine to
be responsible (R. 156-157)
The

objection

Recommendation
Appellant

was

objected

to

the

filed

Domestic

June

Relations

Commissioner's

26, 1987, in which Defendant-

to the Recommendation
7

of

the

Commissioner

regarding the debt due and owing to his parents. (R. 158-159)
A hearing on Defendant-Appellant's objection was held before
the Honorable George E. Ballif of the Fourth Judicial District
Court on the 16th day of December, 1987.
Ballif

subsequently

entered

his

ruling

The Honorable Judge
on

the

17th

day of

December, 1987 as follows:
1.
That the agreement of October, 1974, was not a
mortgage in that it does not describe land to which it
would apply, nor does it contain any provisions
relative to rights, obligations and procedures for
foreclosing the same and was not recorded.
2. That the Decree of Divorce's mention of "mortgage"
without any other reference to the specific obligation
claimed to be a mortgage in favor of a third party,
and not of record, would be insufficient to establish
liability to Plaintiff to pay and discharge that debt.
(R. 199-202)
Defendant-Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on the 13th
day of January, 1988.
D.

(R. 186-187)

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Prior to the marriage of the parties, Defendant, Dale Rothe,
purchased a home at 415 East 900 North, Lehi, Utah.

(R. 130)

At

the time the Defendant purchased the home, he assumed an existing
VA mortgage of $6,818.59 and entered into an agreement with his
father in which Defendants father agreed to loan an additional
$31,484.04.
1974.

The purchase of the home was consummated in October,

(R. 145-147)
The

only

document which evidences
8

the

agreement

between

Defendant and his father is a handwritten agreement which states:
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the house
loan of $38,302.63 minus the Veterans Administration
loan of $6,818.59 plus the interest I will have to pay
to the Bank of America. [The note is then signed Fon
K. Rothe and Dale K. Rothe.] (R. 145)
The parties were married several months later on July 25,
1975.

(R. 1)
The Decree of Divorce was originally signed by Judge George

E. Ballif of the Fourth Judicial District Court on the 24th day
of October, 1980 which reads in pertinent part:
That during the course of the marriage, the parties
have acquired a home located at 415 East 900 North,
Lehi, Utah.
Said home is to be awarded to the
Plaintiff for her exclusive possession. . . . (R. 14)
. . . The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible
for the mortgage due and owing on the home of the
parties. . . .
(R. 14)
At the time of the original divorce, the parties had agreed
among themselves as to the disposition of the property and based
upon the Stipulation of the parties, Defendant agreed to allow
Plaintiff to proceed by way of default -- Defendant having signed
an Appearance, Consent and Waiver.

(R. 5)

For some 30 plus months after the divorce, the Defendant
deducted money from his alimony payments to the Plaintiff for
which Defendant paid an alleged mortgage on the home:
Q.
In paragraph 9, Mrs. [Rothe] Olsen, refers to a
mortgage obligating you to be responsible for the
mortgage due on the property, is that correct?
9

A.

Right.

Q.

Who was that to?

A. I was not sure who it was to. I just knew that
there was a mortgage owing. He had that put into the
papers.
Q.

And you paid it every month, didn't you.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And how did you pay it.

A.

He paid it.

Q. How did you get credit for the payments to satisfy
your obligation? Did he not deduct it from alimony?
A. Oh yes.
(R. 214)
At the time the parties reached a Stipulation and the Decree
was

entered,

the

Plaintiff

obligations which ran

was

required

to

satisfy

with and were attached to the property.

Q. Now when you went to execute these documents with
your husband when the divorce came out, what did you
understand your obligation to be as it relates to the
mortgage?
A.

Well to finish paying off the mortgage.

Q.

What did you understand the term mortgage to mean?

A.

Just what was owing on the home.

Q.
Now there came a time as you say when you
investigated the matter and found out that there was
not anything recorded on the home and property and you
talked to Mr. Harding about that.
A.

only

Right.
10

Q. Now is it your position that because there is no
mortgage on the property, you are not obligated to pay
any money.
A.

Well if there is no mortgage, yes.

(R. 246-247)
Subsequent

to

the

entry

of

the Decree of Divorce, the

Defendant on August 27, 1981, quit claimed his entire interest in
the home and real property to the Plaintiff.

(R. 225)

Plaintiff did not know who the payments were being made to
other than the fact that the Defendant was withholding the money
to pay an asserted mortgage on the home.
For
payments

the

entire

from

time

alimony,

(R. 241)

in which

Defendant was deducting

Plaintiff

received

no

accounting

identifying to whom the payments were being made or if payments
were even being made by the Defendant.

(R. 243)

It was not until Plaintiff attempted to take out a second
mortgage on the home and in the process of doing so became aware
of the fact that there was not a mortgage on the home and upon
advice of counsel discontinued the allowance of the money to be
deducted from Defendant's alimony payment to Plaintiff.

(R. 242)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

Defendant

Dale

Rothe

lacks

standing

to

assert

the

jurisdiction of the Court to enter an Order asserting the rights
of third parties.

Nor is the issue of whether Plaintiff is
11

obligated to pay Defendant's parents ripe for adjudication by
this Court.

In August of 1981, the Defendant quit claimed all

right, title and interest he had in the subject property to the
Plaintiff.

And openly admitted at trial:

Q. And so you don't claim any interest in that house
at all?
A. No.
(R. 230)
Consequently,
property

and

Defendant

has no

interest

further there is no indication

in the

subject

anywhere

in the

record that a judgment has been obtained against the Defendant.
In

fact, in over

two years of non-payment

to his parents,

Defendant testified at trial when asked if his parents had come
against him, merely stated that there was not a good feeling and
then later, in his testimony, admitted that they had not done
anything to enforce the obligation.

(R. 229, 230)

Therefore,

any obligation arising out of the subject property or an interest
therein has no application as it relates to the Defendant.

He

has no standing to exert the rights of his parents nor have
proceedings

or judgment been

initiated

against

the Defendant

which would render the issue ripe for adjudication by this Court.
The Defendants admit in their brief that the handwritten
note between the

Defendant and his father fails to constitute a

legal mortgage which was further reiterated in the ruling by the
12

Honorable George E. Ballif.
The Court correctly found that the note "does not describe
land to which it would apply, nor does it contain any provisions
relative

to

the

rights,

foreclosing the same."

obligations

and

(R. 183, 184)

procedures

for

The note was also not

recorded as required by 57-1-6 Utah Code Annotated.

In addition

to failing the requirements necessary for legal mortgage, the
note also fails as an equitable mortgage.

There is no indication

in the record that the Defendant and his parents had the clear
intent to create a security interest in the property nor that the
property to which it would apply was set out and described with
particularity

sufficient

to establish

a basis

for equitable

mortgage.
Further, it is clear from the transcript that the intent of
the parties

was

that

the

Plaintiff would

assume only those

obligations which ran with or were otherwise attached to the home
and property.

The

focal

issue before

this Court was best

capsulized by Judge Ballif:
I think her testimony was, the way it came down to me,
was that she agreed to pay whatever was against the
house and she thought a mortgage was against the
house.
Now, we've got a very clear legal question
there. Does it meet what would make that apply to the
house? (R. 256)
As one applies the most basic principles of contract law to
the facts of this case, it is evident that Plaintiff is not
13

obligated to pay additional monies to Defendant's parents.
stipulation

entered

into

between

the

parties

The

constitutes

contract in which the parties are entitled to rely.

a

One of the

basic tenants of contract law is that the Court will not alter
the clear and unambiguous terms of a contract in the absence of
fraud or duress.

There is no ambiguity in the wording of the

agreement of the parties when they state that Plaintiff is to
assume "the mortgage on the home."

Consequently, if there is no

mortgage on the home, Plaintiff should not be obligated therefor.
Also, the fact that Defendant withheld money from the alimony
payments in which his parents were supposedly repaid on the loan
does

not

constitute

performance

such

that

a

separate

or

alternative agreement is established.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT DALE ROTHE LACKS STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF ON BEHALF OF HIS PARENTS AND
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE ANY CLAIMS AGAINST THE
PROPERTY PROSECUTED BY THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.
In order for a party to prosecute a cause of action, it is
necessary for the party to have a real stake in the outcome and a
legally protectable and tangible interest to be adjudicated:
In order to support an action, the interest of a party
Plaintiff must be a present, substantial interest, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,
contingent interest. A party must show that he has a
justiciable interest in the subject matter of the
14

litigation to maintain an action thereon. Standing is
a concept utilized to determine if a party is
sufficiently affected so as to insure that a
justiciable controversy is presented to the Court.
The requirement of standing is satisfied if it can be
said that the Plaintiff has a legally protectable and
tangible interest at stake in the litigation. A party
lacks standing to invoke jurisdiction of the Court
unless he or she has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the
subject matter of the action. Standing is that aspect
of justiciability focusing on a party seeking a forum
rather than on the issues he or she wants adjudicated.
The crucial inquiry in this determination is whether
the Plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her
invocation of the Courtfs jurisdiction and to justify
exercise of the Court's remedial power on his or her
behalf. (Emphasis added)
[59 Am Jur 2d Parties Sec. 31.]
Defendant, in seeking the Court's Order modifying the Decree
of Divorce, attempts to assert the rights of his parents to
recover under the agreement entered into between the Defendant
and his father.

The Defendant Dale Rothe, however, lacks the

necessary interest in the outcome as well as lacks the legally
protected right to assert any claims his father may have in the
subject property.

The Defendant testified at the time of trial

that he had quit claimed any and all interest he had to the
Plaintiff

in the

subject

property.

Consequently,

the only

interest Defendant has in modifying the Decree of Divorce is to
require Plaintiff to make payments to Defendant's parents for
which Defendant will receive no benefit other than to possibly
15

relieve him of an obligation which his parents may, at some time
in the future, assert against him.
At trial when Defendant was questioned as to whether any
action

had

been

initiated

by

his

parents

to

enforce

the

agreement, he stated:
Q.

When did you make the last payment to your dad?

A.

It was December, I think of '85.

Q. There is a letter that Mr. Watson wrote in May of
f
86 saying that your last payment was in December of
f
85. Do you agree with that?
A.

Yes.

Q. And you have not made any payments, then for two
years?
A.

No.

Q.
Has your
obligation?

father done anything

A.

Yes.

Q.

Have they come against you?

A.

There is not a good feeling.

to report that

They came to Mr. Watson.

. . .

Q. But as of right now they have not done anything to
enforce that obligation?
A.

No. (R. 228-230)

Consequently,

Defendant

lacks

standing

to

pursue

this

matter.
Defendant's lack of standing given the circumstances of this
16

case is further supported by case law.

The Utah Supreme Court in

Terracor vs. Utah Board of State Lands and Forestry, 716 P.2d 796
(Utah

1986) set out

the

applicable

standard

in

determining

whether a party has standing to sue:
This Court has referred to three general standards for
determining whether a litigant has standing.
(Citations omitted.)
The premise upon which these
standards have been constructed is that issues should
generally be litigated by those parties with the most
direct interest in resolution of those issues,
although in some cases, a party does not have the most
immediate or direct interest, may have standing. The
first general criterion is that the 'Plaintiff must be
able to show that he has suffered some distinct and
palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in
the outcome of the dispute.1 (Citations omitted.)
Second, if a Plaintiff does not have standing under
the first criterion, he may have standing if no one
else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case
and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless
that particular Plaintiff has standing to raise the
issue. (Citations omitted.)
Third, even though standing is not found to exist
under the first two criteria, a Plaintiff may none
the less have standing if the issues are unique and of
such great public importance that they ought to be
decided in furtherance of the public interest.
(Citations omitted.)
Id. at 799.
As th€ standard set out supra is applied to the facts of
this case, certainly the Defendant does not have standing to
assert the rights of his parents.

He has no personal stake in

the outcome of the legal dispute in that he has previously deeded
any interest to the property to the Plaintiff and further his
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parents have asserted no claims against him.

Defendant also

fails the second criterion in that his parents are the ones who
hold any right that may be asserted for repayment of the monies
loaned and, consequently, bear the only interest in the outcome
of the case.
because

the

importance

Finally, Defendant also fails the third criterion
issues

that

are not

they

ought

unique

or

of

to be decided

such great public
in

furtherance of

public interest.
For additional Utah citations addressing the subject, see
York vs. Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714
P.2d

679 (Utah 1986).

injury

to others

claims.)
(Plaintiff

(Plaintiff may not allege jeopardy or

in order

to confer

standing

upon his own

See also Jenkins vs. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983).
must

be

able

to

show

that

he has

suffered

some

distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in
the outcome of the legal dispute.)
The Utah Supreme Court has further stated:
As we previously have held, four requirements must be
met in an action for declaratory judgment: (1) There
must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the interest of
the parties must be adverse; (3) the parties seeking
relief must have a legally protectable interest in the
controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties
must be ripe for judicial determination.
Jenkins vs. Finlinson, 607 P.2d 289, 290 (Utah 1980).
Since

no

proceedings

have
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been

initiated

against

the

Defendant putting him at risk or giving him any interest in the
litigation, he has not presented a justiciable issue before the
Court nor has he presented evidence of a right which the Court is
obligated to protect nor has he presented the Court with a cause
of action which is ripe for determination.

Simply expressed,

the Defendant has no liability or interest in this matter other
than to see his parents possibly be repaid on money loaned to
their son.
POINT II
THE RECORD IS VOID OF A SUFFICIENT BASIS TO WARRANT THE
EXISTENCE OF AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE
Section 57-1-14 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended sets
out the statutory form for the creation of a legal mortgage.

A

copy of the statutory provisions are set out under the topic
"Determinative Constitutional and State Statutes."
The trial court having reviewed the facts in light of the
statutory requirements for a mortgage, correctly concluded as
follows:
The Court concludes that the agreement dated October
of 1974 is not a mortgage since it does not describe
land to which it would apply, nor does it contain any
provisions relative to rights, obligations, and
procedures for foreclosing the same, and was not
recorded. (R. 183, 184.)
The Appellant candidly admits in their brief that the note
between Defendant and his father fails to meet the requirements
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necessary

to

establish

a valid

legal

mortgage.

However,

Appellants do assert that an equitable mortgage exists.
Several authorities have sought to define what constitutes
an equitable mortgage:
There are a number of situations wherein instruments
which are not effective as mortgages at law will be
regarded as such and a court of equity or chancery,
which will regard them as binding on the parties as if
mortgages in due form have been properly executed.
Such instruments are known as equitable mortgages.
This rule is referable to the maxim that 'equity
considers that as done which ought to be done, f
although when applied to particular cases, it is
frequently based also on other equitable grounds. The
circumstances upon which equitable mortgages may be
predicated are various.
Broadly speaking, the
reservation of a lien on property which is conveyed,
an appropriation of specific property to secure the
performance of an obligation or an attempt to create
a mortgage although insufficient to constitute a
mortgage at law, will in equity be given the effect
and operation of a mortgage.
Although an equitable mortgage may be predicated upon
an agreement to give a mortgage, the general rule is
that an instrument cannot operate as an equitable
mortgage if it merely assumes that a lien has been or
will be created; it must purport through its own terms
and efficiency to create the lien. (Emphasis added.)
55 Am Jur 2d Mortgages, Sec. 11 P. 200 - 201.
Corpus

Juris Secundum

has defined

equitable

mortgage

follows:
An equitable mortgage may be constituted by any
writing from which the intention to create such lien
may be gathered.
Thus, a contract in writing to
secure a debt specified therein, in which the parties
expressly declare their intention to create a lien on
real estate particularly described, is generally
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as

considered an equitable mortgage, which, on nonpayment of the debt or other breach of conditions of
the instrument, may be foreclosed in the ordinary way
in a Court of equity. (Emphasis added.)
59 CJS Mortgages Sec. 14, P. 44-45.
The definition of an equitable mortgage as set out in the
authorities cited, requires at least two things:

First, the

writing must expressly declare the intention of the parties to
create a lien on the real estate and second, the writing must
particularly

describe

the property

to which

the

lien would

attach.
The only writing in which Appellant purports to establish a
basis

for the equitable mortgage

entered

into between

Defendant

is a hand written document

and his

father prior

to the

parties marriage which is not notarized and not recorded reads as
follows:
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the house
loan of $38,302.63 minus the Veterans Administration
loan of $6,818.59 plus the interest I will have to pay
to Bank of America. [Signed Fon K. Rothe and Dale K.
Rothe.]
The agreement makes no express declaration or evidence of an
intent between the parties to cieate a lien or security interest
in the property.

The agreement merely acknowledges an obligation

to pay $150.00 per month on the note.
to

establish

an

equitable

mortgage

The agreement also fails
because

there

is

no

description or identification that would attach the mortgage to a
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particular piece of property.

The only wording in the agreement

which even remotely makes reference is the language which states:
Dale Rothe agrees to pay $150.00 a month on the house
loan of $38,302.65. . . .
As one reads the agreement, it is clear that the intent of
the parties was to acknowledge an obligation of paying $150.00 a
month on a loan between Defendant and his father.

Nothing in the

agreement evidences an intention to lien the property.
Powell on The Law of Real Property accurately sets out the
underlying purpose for equitable mortgages:
In cases in which the parties intended to create a
mortgage but some defect in the execution of the
mortgage instrument would make the mortgage legally
unenforceable, courts are willing to recognize the
transaction as an equitable mortgage.
Thus if the
parties fail to name a trustee in a deed of trust by
mistake, or if a mortgage covering reality owned by
husband and wife was signed only by the wife, the
Court will sustain the defective instrument as an
equitable mortgage.
Many of the situations treated as effective to create
equitable mortgages involve a genuine and discoverable
intent of the parties to create a security interest,
but fail to resort to any of the commonly recognized
forms of mortgage.
Powell The Law of Real Property, Sec. 46.
All

of

the

authorities

which

set

out

and

define

the

requirements of equitable mortgage require a clear demonstration
by the parties of their intent to create a security interest.
Typically, those situations in which the Courts will exercise
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their equitable powers are in the situation where an attempt is
made to create a mortgage but due to some technicality, the
parties have failed to create a legal mortgage.
On several occasions, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed
the issue of equitable mortgage; however, the cases cited by the
Appellant and all of the cases in which Respondent has been able
to research have dealt with the situation in which a deed to
property has been transferred to a party in exchange for money.
The issue of equitable mortgage arises under those circumstances
when one of the parties claim that the transfer of the deed in
exchange for money was in fact a mortgage as opposed to an actual
sale of the property.

In other words, where the property is

intended to give security for the monies received under those
circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that a party must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the intent of the party was
to create a security interest:
The burden of proof is on the party claiming a
mortgage, here the Browns, to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the conveyance was intended
as a mortgage. . . .
The standard of appellate review of findings in equity
cases, even where the level of proof in the trial
court is clear and convincing evidence is the clearly
preponderates standard.
Brown vs. Loveland, 678 2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984).

For other Utah

citations involving equitable mortgages as it relates to deeds,
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see Baker vs. Taggart, 628 P.2d 1283 (Utah 1981).
Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976).

Hansen vs.

Jacobsen vs. Jacobsen, 557

P.2d 156 (Utah 1976).

Gibbons vs. Gibbons, 103 Utah 266, 135

P.2d 105 (Utah 1943).

Corey vs. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d

940 (Utah 1933).

The definition of equitable mortgage as cited

supra, provide that instruments aside from deeds can also give
rise to equitable mortgages and Appellant cites three cases in
support of the proposition.

As one applies the standard set out

requiring a clear intent of the parties to be evidenced as well
as a description of the particular property as a predicate to the
exercise of a court's equitable powers necessarily relies upon
the facts of each and every case.

Coast Bank vs. Minderhout, 38

Cal. Rptr. 505 392 P.2d 265 (1964) cited by Defendant included an
instrument

entered

into between the parties which

stated

follows:
Agreement Not to Encumber or Transfer Property.
In consideration of any loan or advance made by Bank
of Belmont Shore (hereinafter referred to as 'bank')
to the undersigned, either jointly or severally, the
undersigned (hereinafter referred to as 'borrower'
whether one or more), jointly and severally promise
and agree that until all such loans and advances and
all other indebtedness or liabilities to the bank
shall have been paid in full, or until 21 years
following the death of the last survivor of the
undersigned, whichever shall first occur, they will
pay all taxes, assessments and charges of every kind,
imposed or levied, or which may be imposed or levied
upon the hereinafter described real property prior to
the time when any of such taxes, assessments or
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as

charges shall become delinquent and will not, without
the consent in writing of bank, first had and
obtained, create or permit any lien or other
encumbrances (other than those presently existing
and/or securing the payment of loans and advances made
to them by bank) to exist on said real property, and
will not transfer, sell, hypothecate, assign or in any
manner would ever dispose of said real property, or
any interest therein or any portion thereof, which
real property is situated in San Louis, Obispo County,
California [wherein a legal description of the
property was given] [description omitted].
It is further agreed and understood that a default be
made in the performance of any of the terms thereof,
or of any instrument executed by borrower in
connection herewith, or in the payment of any
indebtedness or liabilities now or hereafter owing to
bank, bank may, at its election, in addition to all
other remedies and rights which it may have by law,
declare the entire remaining unpaid principle and
interest of any obligations or indebtedness then
remaining unpaid to the bank due and payable
forthwith.
It is further agreed and understood that the bank may,
in its discretion, and is hereby authorized by
borrower, to cause this instrument to be recorded at
such time and in such places as the bank may, in its
discretion, elect. (Emphasis added.)
Coast Bank Footnote 2 at 266.
The

instrument

cited

in

which

the

Court

determined

constituted an equitable mortgage was properly recorded.
Court went

on

to

set out

the

standard

as to

the

elements

necessary for equitable mortgage as follows:
Every express executory agreement in writing, whereby
the contracting party sufficiently indicate an
intention to make some particular property, real or
personal or fund therein described or identified, a
security for a debt or other obligation *** creates an
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The

equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which
is enforceable against the property in the hands not
only of the original contractor but of his ***
purchasers or encumbrancers with notice.
(Citations
omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
Coast Bank

at 266.

The second case cited by Appellants where the Court found
an equitable mortgage was based upon the transfer of a Warranty
Deed and an agreement of the parties.

The Court determined with

regard to the agreement:
The balance of the parties' agreement was never
reduced to writing, but both parties, while differing
over some of its terms, recognize its existence.
Benton vs. Benton, 526 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Kansas 1974)
The opinion of the Court does not set out what the terms of
the agreement encompassed other than to say that both parties
recognized its existence.
The third authority cited by Appellant not involving the
transfer of a deed was Hill vs. Hill, 185 Kansas 389, 345 P. 2d
1015 (1959).

The Kansas Court in finding an equitable mortgage

relied upon an instrument entered into between the parties which
provided as follows:
$2,500.00

February 20 1952

On or before Feb. 20-1957 or on demand after date I
promise to pay to the order of W.E. Hill or his Estate
Twenty Five Hundred Dollars
No Dollars Payable
At Emporia State Bank - with interest at 5% per annum
- Value Received. No
Due
Feb. 20-1957
W.W. Hill
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R. 4. Emporia Kans.
On the reverse
following:

side

of

the

note

appeared

the

This note is given in payment for a loan of
$2,5000.00 in cash to make first payment of Arthur
Glaze and Marjorie Glaze property - bought by W.W.
Hill - Lot 21 - in Copely Addition to City of
Emporia - House No. 115 S. Constitution StEmporia, Kans. It is hereby agreed that the Holder
of this note shall have $2,500.00 interest in
above described Property - besides his Legal
interest as heir to Estate of W.W. Hill.
I hereby agree to this agreement - 2-20-1952
W.W. Hill
Paid $750.00 Oct. 15, 1952 from acct. at Columbia
Bid & Loan Co.
Wm. E. Hill

(Emphasis added)

As evidenced LJ the writings associated with the cases cited
by Defendant/Appellant, the writings upon which the Court relies
all

specifically

demonstrate

an intent to create

a security

interest and specifically identified the property to which the
security interest would attach.
The burden of proof is upon the Defendant who is asserting
that an equitable mortgage exists to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the Defendant and his father intended to create a
mortgage on the property.
the

burden

of

As one reviews the record in light of

proof upon the

Defendant, it is quite clear

Defendant and his father did not even contemplate creating a
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mortgage.

Particularly,

in

light

of

the

testimony

of

the

Defendant when he was asked at trial regarding the subject of
mortgages,

and

testified

as to his understanding

of what a

mortgage entails, it was clear that he did not understand the
nature of a security interest but merely borrowed money from his
father which was evidenced by a note:
Q. Had you ever bought or sold real property before
this house?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you know what a mortgage means?

A. Well a mortgage to me means the same thing -- I
mean, somebody owes some money.
I mean, you buy an
outfit, a house, and you owe the money to them until
that money is paid up, you know.
I mean, that's a
mortgage. (R. 230)
In light of the testimony of the Defendant, he did not
understand the nature of a mortgage and, in fact, even admits in
his brief:
Defendant/Appellant indicated he did not understand
the legal significance of Utah Statute regarding
mortgages. . . .
Defendant/Appellant Brief, page 31.
In light of the testimony of the Defendant and the burden of
proof which is upon him to show a clear intent to create a
mortgage and to describe with particularity the property to which
it would

apply

as

a prerequisite

to

establish

a basis

for

equitable mortgage, the Defendant has failed to meet his burden
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of proof.
POINT III
THE PARTIES ARE BOUND BY THE CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS WORDING OF THEIR AGREEMENT AND THE
COURT WILL NOT REWRITE THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
The Complaint filed by the Plaintiff for a Decree of Divorce
specifically

sets

out

the

agreement

of

the

parties.

The

Defendant, by signing the Appearance, Consent and Waiver agreed
and stipulated to the terms set out in Plaintiff's claim for
relief.

The

constitutes
applicable.

a

Stipulation
contract

entered

for

into

which

between

contract

the

parties

principles

are

The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

Where questions arise in the interpretation of an
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the
document itself.
It should be looked at in its
entirety and in accordance with this purpose. All of
its parts should be given effect insofar as that is
possible. (Citations omitted.)
Big Cottonwood Tanner D. vs. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359
(Utah App. 1987).
The portion of the stipulation or contract pertinent to this
cause of action states:
The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible for the
mortgage due and owing upon the home of the parties. .
. (R. 3)
When

the

standard

is

applied

to

the

terms

of

the

Stipulation, it is clear from the document and the wording that
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the only obligation is for the mortgage due and owing on the
home.

The word mortgage is a term of art which has specific

meaning and the parties are bound by the wording and the term of
art used.
The definition of a mortgage is distinctively set out in
Black's Dictionary as follows:
A mortgage is an interest in land created by a written
instrument providing security for the performance of a
duty or the payment of a debt.
The issue of whether a mortgage existed on the property at
the time of the Decree of Divorce has been previously addressed
in the discussion on whether the agreement between Defendant and
his

father

constituted

a

legal

or

equitable

mortgage.

Consequently, since no mortgage existed at the time of the Decree
of Divorce, Plaintiff is not obligated to make the payments to
Defendant's

parents.

The Court, on numerous occasions, has

stated that the Court will not make a better contract for the
parties then they have made for themselves.

See Rio Aglom Corp.

vs. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1980); Provo City Corp. vs.
Nielson Scott Company, Inc., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979).
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POINT IV
DEFENDANT INAPPROPRIATELY ASSERTS THAT PLAINTIFF HAD
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF WHICH MORTGAGES WERE OWING
ON THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF THE DECREE AND
THE THIRTY SOME ODD PAYMENTS MADE AFTER THE DECREE
TO DEFENDANT'S PARENTS CONSTITUTES PARTIAL PERFORMANCE.
At the time the home was originally purchased, the Defendant
assumed

an

existing

VA

mortgage

$31,484.04 from his father.

of

6,818.59

and

borrowed

At the time the home was purchased

and the money borrowed as well as the assumption of the existing
VA mortgage, Plaintiff was not privy to any of those transactions
and, in fact, the parties were not even married until several
months after the fact.

Consequently, whatever payments were made

during the marriage on outstanding obligations was information
supplied by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.
Defendant asserts in their brief that constructive notice is
imparted to the Plaintiff for those items of record relating to
the

property

and

further

asserts, therefore,

Plaintiff

had

constructive notice at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered
that

the VA

however,

the

loan had
Defendant

been

extinguished.

stops

one

fatal

In so asserting,
step

short

of what

constructive notice would have been imparted to the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff would have been on constructive notice first that the
VA loan had been extinguished but also would have been put on
notice

that

there was no

existing
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mortgages

at all on the

property since the agreement between Defendant and his father had
not been recorded but was merely an acknowledgement of a personal
obligation between the Defendant and his father.

Therefore, when

the parties entered into the Stipulation in which Plaintiff would
take the home subject to any mortgages would further support
Plaintiff's position that she is not obligated to pay Defendant's
parents.
Defendant also asserts in their brief that the fact that 38
payments

were made to Defendant's parents

subsequent

to the

Decree of Divorce acknowledges Plaintiff assent to assume the
note to Defendant's parents.

This assertion is not persuasive.

The Plaintiff had no knowledge of who the payments were made to
and in fact it was the Defendant who took it upon himself to make
the

payments

alimony.

and

then

deducted

the money

from

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff testified at trial:

Q.
In paragraph 9 Mrs. Olsen refers to a mortgage
obligating you to be responsible for the mortgage due
on the property, is that correct?
A.

Right.

Q.

Who was that to?

A.
I was not sure who it was to I just knew that
there was a mortgage owing. He had that put into the
papers.
Q.

And you paid it every month didn't you?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

And how did you pay it?

A.

He paid it.

Q.
How did you get credit for the payments to
satisfy your obligation?
Did he not deduct it from
alimony?
A.

Oh yes.

Q.

And he did that for how many months?

A.

I think he said 30.

Q.

You said 38.

A.

What.

Q.

Do you remember the number 38 month?

I wasn't for sure how many.

A. No. I thought somebody said 30 months.
Dale said I would pay him for 30 months.
Q.

Do you have quarrel with that figure.

A.

No.

I thought

Q.
And for 30 or some odd months the money was
deducted from your alimony checks, was it not?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And who did you think it was going to?

A. I did not know.
(R. 240, 241)

He was just taking it out. . . .

Not only did Plaintiff not make the payments directly but
also she was unaware of who the payments were made to.

The money

was merely deducted from the alimony payments otherwise owing to
her.

The fact that Defendant withheld the monies out of her

alimony payment does not rise to the level of establishing a
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course of conduct which would evidence an agreement or contract
between

the

parties

obligating

the

Plaintiff

to

assume

the

monthly payments.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN REFUSING TO FIND A
MUTUAL MISTAKE.
Defendant/Appellant attempts to take the clear language of
the Divorce Decree, which states:
The Plaintiff is to assume and be responsible for the
mortgage due and owing on the home of the parties, and
the obligation due and owing on the ciutomobile. (R.
16)
and to create an ambiguity in the language as to have the Court
look behind the actual language of the contract.

There is no

ambiguity in the clear wording of the Decree of Divorce.
There is no ambiguity in the clear wording of the Decree of
Divorce.
Although
Defendant

Defendant/Appellant

was unrepresented

assert

at the

time

in their brief
the

that

documents were

drafted and that it was Plaintiff's attorney who drafted the
documents.

The uncontrov^rted testimony at trial states:

Q.
Paragraph 9, Mrs. Olsen, refers to a mortgage
obligating you to be responsible for the mortgage due
on the property, is that correct?
A.

Right.

Q.

Who was that to?
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A. I was not sure who it was to. I just knew that
there was a mortgage owing. He had that put into the
papers. (Emphasis added) (R. 240)
Although Plaintiff's attorney was the one who drafted the
documents, the provisions regarding the mortgage were put into
the

Decree

of

Divorce

at

the

request

of

the

Defendant.

Consequently, Defendant cannot now assert that he does not agree
with the language used or the provisions in the contract when
they were put into the documents at his request and further,
after signing a consent and waiver, agreeing that he understood
the provision and was willing to abide by it.
There is an almost unending list of case law standing for
the proposition that where a contract is plain and unambiguous,
parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms and that in
order for parol evidence to be admitted, the Court must first
determine that an ambiguity exists.

See Hartman vs. Potter, 596

P.2d 653 (Utah 1979); Williams vs. First Colony Life Insurance
Company,

593

P.2d

534

(Utah

1979);

Jaye

Smith

Construction

Company vs. Board of Education Granite School District, 560 P.2d
320

(Utah 1977); Union Bank vs. Swensen, 707 P.2d

1985);

Faulkner vs. Farnsworth,

665 P.2d

663 (Utah

1292, Appeal After

Remand 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1983).
Defendant considers at length, in his brief, the intent and
understanding of the Plaintiff; however, Plaintiff's intent and
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understanding has no bearing on the question of whether a legal
or equitable mortgage exists because the existence of a mortgage
depends

on

the

agreement

and

intent

of

the

Defendant

Defendant's father at the time the money was loaned.

and

The intent

of the Plaintiff and any parol evidence relating thereto is not
even

admissible

unless

the

Court

first

determines

that the

agreement of the parties in which "the Plaintiff is to assume and
be responsible for the mortgage due and owing on the home of the
parties.

. ." is ambiguous

and necessitates

the offering of

parol evidence.
Even assuming

arguendo that the terms of the Decree or

contract are ambiguous, it was the intention of the Plaintiff
only to assume those obligations which were attached to and ran
with the property itself.

Defendant testified:

Q. Will you tell the Court as best you can what you
understood the reason why you were paying the Dale's
parents the payments on the home.
A. Well, I thought it was because they had a note on
the home, well I knew there was a note, but I thought
it was a mortgage.
Q.
So you thought the loan to the parents was, in
fact, a mortgage on the property?
A.

Right.

(R. 246)

The trial court also determined based upon the testimony of
the parties that it was the intent on the part of Plaintiff to
assume only those obligations which were attached to and ran with
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the property itself-

At the trial, Judge Ballif stated:

Well, you know, a person that doesn't practice law and
gets into financial things and security transaction
doesn't necessarily know how something applies against
a home.
But I think what she undertook to do, it
looks like to me, was to pay off what was against the
home. And so the problem is, is this note against the
home? (R. 257)
When

one

applies

the

intent

and

understanding

of

the

Plaintiff as set out in her testimony and the findings of the
Court, it is consistent with the clear and unambiguous language
of the Decree that Plaintiff only assumed those obligations which
were attached to and ran with the property.
POINT VI
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BY THE APPELLATE COURT OF
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS A "CLEARLY PREPONDERANTS" STANDARD.
The Defendant/Appellant correctly sets out the standard of
review when he states in his brief:
In equity cases, the Appellate Court can review facts
as well as law and may reverse the lower court's
finding if the evidence "clearly preponderants"
against the trial court's decision.
Mcbride vs.
Mcbride, 581 P.2d 996 (Utah 1978); Peterson vs.
Carter, 579 P.2d 329 (Utah 1978); Provo City vs.
Lambert, 574 P.2d 727 (Utah 1978); Hatch vs. Bastian,
567 P.2d 1100 (Utah 1977); Richards vs. Pine Ranch,
Inc., 559 P.2d 948 (Utah 1977).
Appellant's Brief, page 21.
As the Court applies the appropriate standard of review to
the holding of the District Court, the evidence does not clearly
preponderate against Judge BallifTs holding.
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Defendant openly

admits that a legal mortgage did not exist and as to equitable
mortgage, the testimony is very scant as to whether the Defendant
and

his

father

intended

to create

a security

interest

and

further, there is no description of the property for which it
would attach.

Aside from the note which is part of the record,

the only testimony even addressing the issue is that testimony
which relates to Defendant's understanding of what a mortgage
entails. It is clear from the testimony cited supra Defendant did
not understand the nature of a mortgage or a security interest
consequently,

it would

be

impossible

to

show

by

clear

and

convincing evidence that a mortgage or a security interest was
intended.
In addition, the wording of the Decree of Divorce is clear
and unambiguous as to the agreement of the parties thus parol
evidence is inadmissible and based upon the facts and the record,
Defendant

has

failed

to

show

that

the

evidence

"clearly

preponderants" against such a finding.
Most importantly, however, is the issue of standing and
ripeness.

The issues of equitable and legal mortgage need not

even be addressed because Defendant/Appellant is not the real
party in interest and lacks standing to assert the rights, if
any, of his parents.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, Plaintiff

respectfully

requests this Court to

affirm the decision of the trial court and the Domestic Relations
Commissioner in ruling that Plaintiff should not be burdened with
the obligation of repaying Defendant's parents.
DATED this 2^

day of November, 1988.

*ICHARD B. JOfir
RICHARD
JOHNSfl
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
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following, postage prepaid.
Mr. Wayne Watson
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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